Trump wants to grant private cyber firms a license to hack back
Contractors could surveil and disrupt foreign criminal networks, provided they follow strict rules and put up $1M
Donald Trump is allowing government agencies to contract private cybersecurity companies to carry out operations against cyber-enabled transnational criminal organizations (CE-TCOs).
The US President signed a memo on Wednesday confirming a strategy hinted at earlier this year, saying participating companies can support national operations against criminals, including cyber surveillance and technical disruptions of their networks.
The latter, described as "Cyber Effects Operations," covers activities that cause "the manipulation, disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction of information systems, networks, physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by information systems, or information resident thereon."
Although the memo establishes a distinction between cyber effects operations and cyber surveillance missions, it acknowledged that the latter will also inevitably involve some disruption or manipulation of systems in order to carry out the surveillance.
Surveillance operations are designed for intel gathering, either to support further snooping or for later use in cyber effects operations, with the intent of remaining undetected.
Trump described CE-TCOs as "any foreign group that conducts cyber-enabled crime against the United States Government, a United States person, or United States interests."
Crucially, the definition excludes entities directly associated with, or operating wholly on behalf of, foreign governments. No stepping on TAO's toes, of course.
Participating companies will undergo "rigorous vetting" and will be subject to "strict operational procedures," the memo adds.
The operational procedures are to be drawn up within 60 days and codified by program executive directors working with the Homeland Security Council.
Companies wishing to be called up for service will have to demonstrate that they have the technical capabilities to carry out the required operations, and be willing to prove this each year via annual evaluations.
Program managers must ensure that the operational procedures open opportunities for highly resourced, large organizations, as well as "smaller, more agile companies" that may prove useful for "specialized or discrete tasks."
The Justice Department will also play a role in authorizing operations, particularly those targeting US residents or raising domestic legal issues.
Participating companies will also be prohibited from executing operations that could lead to "critical outcomes," which is shorthand for attacks that result in the loss of life or serious injury, or those that could be seen as an armed attack under international law.
These companies will also be required to maintain a bond or escrow of at least $1 million, which shall be forfeited if they violate the terms of their contracts.
Unleashing Trump's cyber army
The White House published "President Trump's Cyber Strategy for America" document in March, which promised to "unleash the private sector by creating incentives to identify and disrupt adversary networks and scale our national capabilities."
The document [PDF] also stated: "We will leverage the immense talents and ingenuity of our private sector research base.
"We will establish a new level of relationship between the public and private sectors to defend America in peace and war."
The announcement prompted legal eagles and think tanks to ponder the implications of such a move.
Many wondered how the promise to mobilize the private sector would be put into practice. They did not then have the details contained in this week's memo, and some assumed participating companies would support operations against nation-states. This particular program, however, excludes entities acting directly on behalf of foreign governments.
Writing for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and citing reporting available at the time, cyber and tech research fellow Gareth Mott said that the US Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) might need to be amended before American companies could legally offer such services.
Experts from law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom agreed, despite the US Cyber Strategy not mentioning any plans for legislative changes.
They wrote: "Any attempt to more directly involve the private sector in offensive cyber actions will likely require further legal and regulatory changes before it can be meaningfully implemented.
"Even if the administration were to issue new enforcement guidance redirecting prosecutions away from hack-back cases, the availability of civil penalties under the CFAA and its five-year statute of limitations would likely render such executive actions significantly less impactful.
"Technology companies should consider closely monitoring developments to track how the administration plans to enact such incentives."
However, Jenner & Block lawyers noted in an analysis published by Lawfare that a provision of the CFAA could limit participating companies' exposure.
Title 18 of the US Code, § 1030(f), says the CFAA does not prohibit lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity by a US government agency or intelligence agency.
Participating companies might therefore be protected when acting under government contracts and direction. However, no court has determined whether that exemption covers private companies carrying out such work.
"No court has addressed whether this exception provides any protection for private-sector entities engaged to perform these activities on behalf of the US government and, if so, under what circumstances," the lawyers wrote.
"At the very least, it is unlikely that a court would interpret this provision to extend to private companies engaged in independent offensive operations, without government direction or involvement."
The last part is key: because the US government will draw up procedures and direct the companies' involvement, the work may fall within the CFAA exemption.
Whichever way the US constructs its private sector play, it represents a significant shift in the country's cybersecurity policy, and perhaps that of other nations further down the line.
As Mott points out, US allies will certainly be keeping tabs on the private sector program's success, and its take-up from the companies it looks to attract. ®
Originally published on The Register